TikTok V5 + Security

This commit is contained in:
2026-07-11 22:09:10 +02:00
parent 671c1a1559
commit d542f849aa
36 changed files with 740 additions and 463 deletions

79
src/lib/session.ts Normal file
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import 'server-only';
import crypto from 'crypto';
import { cookies } from 'next/headers';
import { getAuthCookieOptions } from './cookieConfig';
/**
* Signed session cookie.
*
* The auth cookie holds the user id, but it MUST NOT be a bare, forgeable value.
* We attach an HMAC-SHA256 signature keyed with NEXTAUTH_SECRET so the server can
* detect a tampered/forged cookie and reject it. Format: `<userId>.<signature>`.
*/
export const AUTH_COOKIE_NAME = 'userId';
function getSecret(): string {
const secret = process.env.NEXTAUTH_SECRET;
if (!secret) {
throw new Error('NEXTAUTH_SECRET is not set — cannot sign or verify session cookies');
}
return secret;
}
function computeSignature(userId: string): string {
return crypto.createHmac('sha256', getSecret()).update(userId).digest('base64url');
}
/**
* Produce the signed cookie value for a user id.
*/
export function signUserId(userId: string): string {
return `${userId}.${computeSignature(userId)}`;
}
/**
* Verify a signed cookie value. Returns the user id if the signature is valid,
* otherwise null. Uses a constant-time comparison to avoid signature timing leaks.
*/
export function verifySignedUserId(value: string | undefined | null): string | null {
if (!value) return null;
const separator = value.lastIndexOf('.');
if (separator <= 0 || separator === value.length - 1) {
return null;
}
const userId = value.slice(0, separator);
const providedSig = value.slice(separator + 1);
const expectedSig = computeSignature(userId);
const providedBuf = Buffer.from(providedSig);
const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expectedSig);
if (providedBuf.length !== expectedBuf.length) {
return null;
}
if (!crypto.timingSafeEqual(providedBuf, expectedBuf)) {
return null;
}
return userId;
}
/**
* Read and verify the authenticated user id from the request cookies.
* Returns null when no valid, correctly-signed session cookie is present.
*
* Use this in route handlers instead of reading the `userId` cookie directly.
*/
export function getSessionUserId(): string | null {
return verifySignedUserId(cookies().get(AUTH_COOKIE_NAME)?.value);
}
/**
* Set the signed auth cookie for the given user id (server component / route handler context).
*/
export function setSessionCookie(userId: string): void {
cookies().set(AUTH_COOKIE_NAME, signUserId(userId), getAuthCookieOptions());
}