Timo Knuth
113acc073f
Groundwork for testmodul.qrmaster.net, a second stack running the `test` branch on a real qrmaster.net subdomain. Production scopes its session cookie to .qrmaster.net, so the browser sends it to every subdomain including staging. With both environments naming the cookie `userId`, the browser holds two cookies of the same name and cookies.get() picks one arbitrarily - staging logins would look randomly signed-out. AUTH_COOKIE_NAME lets staging pick `userId_test` instead. Production keeps the `userId` default; changing it there would invalidate every existing session. Wired getAuthCookieName() into the six places that named the cookie literally. The account deletion route now expires both the host-only and the domain-scoped variant like the logout route already does, instead of a single cookies().delete() that would leave the other one behind. NEXT_PUBLIC_WWW_URL and NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL become build ARGs so the same image can be built pointing at the staging host - the defaults keep a plain production build byte identical to before. Like COOKIE_DOMAIN these must exist at build time, because process.env is inlined into the Edge middleware bundle. robots.ts now serves Disallow-all unless NEXT_PUBLIC_INDEXABLE is true. Staging otherwise returns the production robots.txt and invites crawlers to index a duplicate of www. docker-compose.test.yml is the staging overlay. Two things it must get right, both verified against `docker compose config`: - db and redis need `networks: !override`. Compose MERGES the networks mapping from the base file, and since qrmaster-network is external and shared, a plain list left them attached to it - `db` would then resolve to two containers and staging could read and write the production database. - The web entrypoint is replaced so `prisma migrate deploy` never runs. prisma/migrations stopped in April 2026 and the schema has moved on through manual SQL since, so applying them to a fresh database would build a stale schema. Staging gets its schema from `pg_dump --schema-only` against production instead. Verified: tsc clean, production build succeeds, and the merged compose config confirms staging keeps db/redis off the shared network while production resolves unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
78 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript
78 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript
import 'server-only';
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import crypto from 'crypto';
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import { cookies } from 'next/headers';
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import { getAuthCookieName, getAuthCookieOptions } from './cookieConfig';
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/**
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* Signed session cookie.
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*
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* The auth cookie holds the user id, but it MUST NOT be a bare, forgeable value.
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* We attach an HMAC-SHA256 signature keyed with NEXTAUTH_SECRET so the server can
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* detect a tampered/forged cookie and reject it. Format: `<userId>.<signature>`.
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*/
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function getSecret(): string {
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const secret = process.env.NEXTAUTH_SECRET;
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if (!secret) {
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throw new Error('NEXTAUTH_SECRET is not set - cannot sign or verify session cookies');
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}
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return secret;
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}
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function computeSignature(userId: string): string {
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return crypto.createHmac('sha256', getSecret()).update(userId).digest('base64url');
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}
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/**
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* Produce the signed cookie value for a user id.
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*/
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export function signUserId(userId: string): string {
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return `${userId}.${computeSignature(userId)}`;
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}
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/**
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* Verify a signed cookie value. Returns the user id if the signature is valid,
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* otherwise null. Uses a constant-time comparison to avoid signature timing leaks.
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*/
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export function verifySignedUserId(value: string | undefined | null): string | null {
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if (!value) return null;
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const separator = value.lastIndexOf('.');
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if (separator <= 0 || separator === value.length - 1) {
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return null;
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}
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const userId = value.slice(0, separator);
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const providedSig = value.slice(separator + 1);
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const expectedSig = computeSignature(userId);
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const providedBuf = Buffer.from(providedSig);
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const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expectedSig);
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if (providedBuf.length !== expectedBuf.length) {
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return null;
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}
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if (!crypto.timingSafeEqual(providedBuf, expectedBuf)) {
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return null;
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}
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return userId;
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}
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/**
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* Read and verify the authenticated user id from the request cookies.
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* Returns null when no valid, correctly-signed session cookie is present.
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*
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* Use this in route handlers instead of reading the `userId` cookie directly.
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*/
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export function getSessionUserId(): string | null {
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return verifySignedUserId(cookies().get(getAuthCookieName())?.value);
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}
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/**
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* Set the signed auth cookie for the given user id (server component / route handler context).
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*/
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export function setSessionCookie(userId: string): void {
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cookies().set(getAuthCookieName(), signUserId(userId), getAuthCookieOptions());
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}
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