Brings the working codebase (Next.js app, auth system, Stripe billing, Docker/deploy config, tests, docs) into version control on top of the placeholder initial commit, and adds account self-deletion (Danger Zone in Settings, password + typed-email confirmation, cascading DB cleanup, Stripe cancellation) per GDPR right-to-erasure. Excludes local build caches, node_modules, and internal agent scratch files; .gitignore hardened to keep those out going forward. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
126 lines
6.0 KiB
YAML
126 lines
6.0 KiB
YAML
services:
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postgres:
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image: postgres:16-alpine
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container_name: scanreceipts_postgres
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restart: unless-stopped
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environment:
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POSTGRES_USER: ${POSTGRES_USER:-receipt_user}
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-receipt_secure_password}
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POSTGRES_DB: ${POSTGRES_DB:-receipt_scanner}
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ports:
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# Host port 5436 by default: 5432 is commonly taken by another project's
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# database on a dev machine, and binding it would fail the whole stack.
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# The container still listens on 5432 internally, so the `app` service's
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# DATABASE_URL (postgres:5432) is unaffected.
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- "${POSTGRES_PORT:-5436}:5432"
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volumes:
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- postgres_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
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# Database least privilege: provision the runtime role `receipt_app` on a
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# FRESH volume. Initdb scripts run as POSTGRES_USER (superuser), which is
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# exactly the rights needed to create the role and set default privileges.
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# They only run once, at first volume creation — an already-initialized
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# database (like the local dev DB) must be set up with
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# `node scripts/apply-db-permissions.mjs` instead.
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- ./scripts/db-permissions.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/10-db-permissions.sql:ro
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healthcheck:
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test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U ${POSTGRES_USER:-receipt_user} -d ${POSTGRES_DB:-receipt_scanner}"]
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interval: 5s
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timeout: 5s
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retries: 5
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start_period: 10s
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networks:
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- scanreceipts_network
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app:
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build:
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context: .
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dockerfile: Dockerfile
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args:
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NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL: ${NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL:-http://localhost:3000}
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NEXT_PUBLIC_UMAMI_SRC: ${NEXT_PUBLIC_UMAMI_SRC:-}
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NEXT_PUBLIC_UMAMI_ID: ${NEXT_PUBLIC_UMAMI_ID:-}
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container_name: scanreceipts_app
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restart: unless-stopped
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depends_on:
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postgres:
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condition: service_healthy
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ports:
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- "3000:3000"
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volumes:
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# Grants the admin dashboard's "Docker Logs" page (/admin/logs) access
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# to `docker logs -f`. SECURITY: mounting the Docker socket gives this
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# container root-equivalent control of the host — anyone who can
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# execute code inside the app container (e.g. via an app vulnerability)
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# can use it to control every container and, from there, the host
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# itself. The API route is admin-gated (getAdminUser), but that only
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# protects the intended entry point, not this blast radius. Remove this
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# mount (and docker-entrypoint-logs.sh / the docker-cli + su-exec
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# packages in the Dockerfile) if that trade-off isn't acceptable for
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# your deployment.
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# Not :ro — docker-entrypoint-logs.sh chmods the socket at container
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# startup (see that script for why a plain group-permission fix isn't
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# reliable here), which needs the mount to be writable.
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- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock
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healthcheck:
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# 127.0.0.1, not localhost: Alpine's musl resolver returns ::1 first for
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# "localhost", but the Next.js standalone server (HOSTNAME=0.0.0.0 in the
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# Dockerfile) only binds IPv4 — wget to "localhost" gets connection
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# refused on ::1 even while the app is completely healthy on IPv4.
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test: ["CMD", "wget", "-q", "-O", "/dev/null", "http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/auth/providers"]
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interval: 30s
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timeout: 5s
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retries: 3
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start_period: 20s
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environment:
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- NODE_ENV=production
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# Container-internal address: the host port mapping above is irrelevant in
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# here, services reach each other by service name on the compose network.
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- DATABASE_URL=postgresql://${POSTGRES_USER:-receipt_user}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-receipt_secure_password}@postgres:5432/${POSTGRES_DB:-receipt_scanner}
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# Least-privilege runtime connection (optional): points at the restricted
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# `receipt_app` role created by scripts/db-permissions.sql. The app
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# binary reads DATABASE_URL above, so in production run the runtime with
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# this URL and keep DATABASE_URL (the owner) for migrations/schema init.
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- APP_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://receipt_app:${APP_DATABASE_PASSWORD:-receipt_app_secure_password}@postgres:5432/${POSTGRES_DB:-receipt_scanner}
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- NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL=${NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL:-http://localhost:3000}
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- NEXT_PUBLIC_UMAMI_SRC=${NEXT_PUBLIC_UMAMI_SRC:-}
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- NEXT_PUBLIC_UMAMI_ID=${NEXT_PUBLIC_UMAMI_ID:-}
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- OPENROUTER_API_KEY=${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}
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- OPENROUTER_MODEL=${OPENROUTER_MODEL:-openai/gpt-5.6-luna}
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# Vision fallbacks — scanning still works on OpenRouter alone, but without
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# these the fallback chain has nowhere to go.
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- GEMINI_API_KEY=${GEMINI_API_KEY}
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- OPENAI_API_KEY=${OPENAI_API_KEY}
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- DEEPSEEK_API_KEY=${DEEPSEEK_API_KEY}
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- DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL=${DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL}
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- STRIPE_SECRET_KEY=${STRIPE_SECRET_KEY}
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- STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY=${STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY}
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- STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET=${STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET}
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- STRIPE_WEEKLY_PRICE_ID=${STRIPE_WEEKLY_PRICE_ID}
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- STRIPE_ANNUAL_PRICE_ID=${STRIPE_ANNUAL_PRICE_ID}
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- STRIPE_LIFETIME_PRICE_ID=${STRIPE_LIFETIME_PRICE_ID}
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- DISCORD_SALES_WEBHOOK_URL=${DISCORD_SALES_WEBHOOK_URL}
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# Auth: without these the Google button never renders and signup fails
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# with mail_failed, because NODE_ENV=production refuses the dev fallback.
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- GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID=${GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID}
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- GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=${GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET}
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- SMTP_HOST=${SMTP_HOST}
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- SMTP_PORT=${SMTP_PORT:-587}
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- SMTP_USER=${SMTP_USER}
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- SMTP_PASSWORD=${SMTP_PASSWORD}
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- SMTP_SECURE=${SMTP_SECURE:-false}
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- MAIL_FROM=${MAIL_FROM:-ScanReceipts <no-reply@localhost>}
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- ADMIN_EMAILS=${ADMIN_EMAILS:-}
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# CORS allowlist: comma-separated extra origins allowed to call the API.
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# The app's own origin (NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL) is always allowed.
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- CORS_ORIGINS=${CORS_ORIGINS:-}
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networks:
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- scanreceipts_network
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volumes:
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postgres_data:
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driver: local
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networks:
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scanreceipts_network:
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driver: bridge
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